@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20260902.11,
  author = {Folarin Olusola Olugbenga},
  title = {House of Representatives Leadership Recruitment and Executive Interference in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: 
A Comparative Institutional Analysis},
  journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations},
  volume = {9},
  number = {2},
  pages = {113-121},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20260902.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260902.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20260902.11},
  abstract = {This study examines the dynamics of leadership recruitment in Nigeria’s House of Representatives and the persistent patterns of executive interference that have shaped legislative autonomy throughout the Fourth Republic (1999–2023). Anchored on the Separation of Powers framework, the study analyses how informal political practices, party hierarchies, presidential directives, and elite bargaining often undermine constitutional provisions that guarantee internal legislative independence. Using a qualitative research design grounded in documentary and content analysis of legislative records, media reports, constitutional texts, and scholarly literature, the study provides a comparative assessment of Nigeria’s experience alongside other presidential and hybrid democracies such as Brazil, South Africa, India, and Kenya. Particular attention is given to illustrative episodes, including the emergence of Aminu Tambuwal in 2011, the Dogara–Gbajabiamila contest of 2015, and the coordinated lobbying for Gbajabiamila in 2019, which reveal how political negotiations, factional alignments, and executive preferences often supersede autonomous parliamentary choice. The findings show that these interventions weaken legislative oversight, fuel internal factionalism and distort the institutional balance intended by the Nigerian constitutional framework. The study concludes that Nigeria’s democratic consolidation depends on strengthening internal legislative procedures, reinforcing party institutionalism and ensuring strict adherence to the constitutional norms governing leadership selection. By situating Nigeria’s experience within broader comparative patterns, the study contributes to an understanding on how executive–legislative relations influence institutional performance in emerging presidential democracies.},
 year = {2026}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - House of Representatives Leadership Recruitment and Executive Interference in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: 
A Comparative Institutional Analysis
AU  - Folarin Olusola Olugbenga
Y1  - 2026/04/13
PY  - 2026
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260902.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260902.11
T2  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JF  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JO  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
SP  - 113
EP  - 121
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-2785
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260902.11
AB  - This study examines the dynamics of leadership recruitment in Nigeria’s House of Representatives and the persistent patterns of executive interference that have shaped legislative autonomy throughout the Fourth Republic (1999–2023). Anchored on the Separation of Powers framework, the study analyses how informal political practices, party hierarchies, presidential directives, and elite bargaining often undermine constitutional provisions that guarantee internal legislative independence. Using a qualitative research design grounded in documentary and content analysis of legislative records, media reports, constitutional texts, and scholarly literature, the study provides a comparative assessment of Nigeria’s experience alongside other presidential and hybrid democracies such as Brazil, South Africa, India, and Kenya. Particular attention is given to illustrative episodes, including the emergence of Aminu Tambuwal in 2011, the Dogara–Gbajabiamila contest of 2015, and the coordinated lobbying for Gbajabiamila in 2019, which reveal how political negotiations, factional alignments, and executive preferences often supersede autonomous parliamentary choice. The findings show that these interventions weaken legislative oversight, fuel internal factionalism and distort the institutional balance intended by the Nigerian constitutional framework. The study concludes that Nigeria’s democratic consolidation depends on strengthening internal legislative procedures, reinforcing party institutionalism and ensuring strict adherence to the constitutional norms governing leadership selection. By situating Nigeria’s experience within broader comparative patterns, the study contributes to an understanding on how executive–legislative relations influence institutional performance in emerging presidential democracies.
VL  - 9
IS  - 2
ER  - 

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