Abstract
This study examines the resurgence and institutionalization of radical right-wing politics and conservative nationalism in the 2020s, focusing on Donald J. Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency and the simultaneous rise of far-right parties worldwide. It argues that contemporary radical right movements have moved from the political margins to become influential forces shaping party systems, media environments, and transnational alliances. The study traces ideological alignments, strategic adaptations, and internal tensions within the global right, highlighting expanding networks across the United States, Europe, and the Global South despite disagreements over sovereignty and foreign policy. Commonly associated with “Trumpism,” these movements emphasize nationalist ideology, charismatic leadership, anti-establishment populism, and an “America First” outlook prioritizing national sovereignty, border control, economic protectionism, and skepticism toward multilateral institutions. It views politics as a moral battle between a “virtuous person” and “corrupt person”, delegitimize the media, bureaucratic institutes, and judicial decrees. They increasingly challenge liberal democratic norms through personalized leadership, declining trust in electoral institutions, and confrontational styles of governance grounded in cultural majoritarianism. Methodologically the study adopts a qualitative, comparative and transnational research design, integrating perspectives from comparative politics, international relations and political communication. The significance of the study lies in demonstrating the immergence of “Illiberal Institutional”, the reconfiguration of sovereignty and multilateralism, and the broader implications of the global conservative realignment for the democratic resilience and of the liberal international order.
Keywords
Global Right-Wing Realignment, Illiberal Democracy, Trumpism, Transnational Conservatism, Cultural Majoritarianism
1. Introduction
The return of Donald J. Trump to the White House in January 2025 signifies a crucial moment in the trajectory of global radical right-wing politics and modern conservatism. Unlike his initial presidency, which occurred during a phase of relative international isolation, Trump’s second term is set to coincide with an extraordinary consolidation of ideologically aligned governments and movements across Europe and beyond. This study investigates the transnational resurgence of radical right-wing parties, nationalist conservatism, and populist leadership, situating the United States within a broader realignment of global political standards.
By employing comparative political analysis and contemporary electoral data, the research outlines the recent electoral and institutional successes of radical right actors, including the Freedom Party of Austria’s electoral victory, the Alternative for Germany’s (AfD - Alternative für Deutschland) significant breakthroughs in eastern German states, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally achieving record-high support in the 2024 European Parliament elections, and the normalization of far-right participation in governance in the Netherlands. The study also analyses the entrenchment of post-fascist governance in Italy under Giorgia Meloni, whose ‘Brothers of Italy party’ has sustained power by recalibrating nationalist rhetoric within institutional frameworks. Beyond Europe, the alignment of leaders such as India’s Narendra Modi and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán highlights the global diffusion of illiberal conservatism, characterized by executive centralization, cultural majoritarianism, scepticism toward multilateralism, and challenges to liberal democratic norms. The study contends that present-day radical right movements are different from earlier versions by showcasing strategic adaptability, ideological networking, and an increasing level of legitimacy within democratic systems. Rather than merely serving as fringe opposition forces, these groups now function as governing coalitions and key agenda-setters. The merging of Trumpism with European and non-Western conservative nationalisms points to the rise of a loosely organized yet significant transnational ideological bloc. This bloc prioritizes sovereignty over globalization, cultural identity over liberal pluralism, and strong leadership over institutional restrictions. By integrating recent political developments with theories of populism, illiberal democracy, and conservative realignment, the study offers valuable insights into these phenomena. understanding of how radical right politics are reshaping international relations, democratic governance, and the future of the liberal international order in the mid-2020s.
While considerable scholarship has examined the rise of individual radical right parties across Europe and North America, relatively little research has analysed how these movements have evolved into an interconnected transnational political phenomenon during the 2020s. Existing studies primarily focus on domestic electoral performance, immigration politics, democratic backsliding, or populist discourse in individual countries, often overlooking the ideological convergence and cross-border networking that increasingly characterize contemporary conservative politics
(Muddle 11-23)
| [1] | Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity Press. |
[1]
. Moreover, recent developments including the resurgence of Donald Trump in the United States, the institutional consolidation of Viktor Orbán's illiberal governance in Hungary, the electoral success of Giorgia Meloni in Italy, the growing influence of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, the continued normalization of Marine Le Pen's National Rally in France, and the emergence of Javier Milei in Argentina suggest that contemporary radical right politics has entered a new phase of transnational cooperation while remaining deeply embedded within national political contexts.
Against this background, this study asks:
How have contemporary radical right movements become institutionalized and transnationally connected during the 2020s, and how do these developments reshape liberal democratic norms and the post-Cold War liberal international order?
To answer this overarching question, the study addresses four subsidiary questions:
1) What ideological characteristics distinguish contemporary radical right movements from other conservative and populist traditions?
2) Through what institutional mechanisms have these movements expanded their political influence within democratic systems?
3) How have transnational conservative networks facilitated ideological diffusion and political cooperation across countries?
4) What are the implications of these developments for liberal democracy, international governance, and the future of the liberal international order?
2. Literature Review
2.1. Historical Foundations of the Radical Right
Foundational studies regarding the radical right chart its progression from historical nationalist and post-fascist movements to modern iterations that are integrated into democratic politics. Herbert Kitschelt’s “The Radical Right in Western Europe” is a key text for understanding the structural development of radical right parties. Kitschelt and McGann assert that socio-economic changes in the post-industrial era have shifted political conflict from class-based divisions to cultural and identity-related dimensions, allowing radical right parties that merge nativism with exclusionary nationalism to emerge. This framework is instrumental in placing contemporary right-wing populism within the broader changes in the political arena of Western democracies. Eric Kaufmann's White shift furthers this lineage by stressing the importance of demographic and cultural changes as influences on populist politics. Kaufmann correlates the electoral rise of individuals such as Donald Trump and European populists with fears surrounding identity and majority status, suggesting that these cultural and demographic anxieties are essential for understanding the appeal of today's
(Muddle 11-23)
| [1] | Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity Press. |
[1]
.
2.2. Defining Populism and Radical Conservatism (Trumpism)
Modern academic discourse is increasingly making a distinction between right-wing populism and broader forms of populism or basic anti-elite rhetoric. In “The Rise of Nationalist Populism”, Daniel Rueda investigates the discursive relationship between nationalism and populism in France, Italy, and Spain, demonstrating that these movements are heterogeneous and utilize various ideological approaches based on identity politics and sovereignty narratives. Rueda’s discourse-analytic methodology positions populism as a structured political strategy that harnesses national identity to oppose liberal values and supranational organizations
(Rueda 1-9)
.
The Palgrave Handbook on “Right-Wing Populism and Otherness” stresses the function of 'othering' as a meta-political strategy, whereby right-wing populists create exclusionary identities by contrasting a homogeneous ‘people’ with elites and marginalized out-groups. This perspective reveals that right-wing populism operates not just through policy but also through narratives of exclusion, which are essential to its structural success in various contexts. It contends that a key aspect of the recent rise of right-wing populist politicians worldwide is the prevalent dynamic of exclusionary conflicts and moral divisions, referred to as meta-othering. This is achieved through two distinct forms of otherization: ‘upward’ othering, which targets the elite establishment and their associates, and 'downward' othering, which involves demeaning and scapegoating specific out-groups or external outsiders. The Handbook adopts a multidisciplinary approach and focuses on recent real-world expressions of right-wing populist strategies to justify, enhance, or utilize alterity narratives and claims. It offers a comprehensive analysis of the manifestations of right-wing populism's othering from various cases and variations globally, with a particular emphasis on including examples from the Global South (Alexandre and Christofoletti 1-3)
.
2.3. Transnational Dynamics and the Global Right
A prominent theme in contemporary research is the trans nationalization of radical right ideologies. “World of the Right: Radical Conservatism and Global Order”, shows that the current right is not just a series of disconnected national endeavours but forms a global ideological framework unified by a critique of liberal globalization and the aim of establishing illiberal governance models. The book asserts that radical conservative agents employ Gramscian-inspired counter-hegemonic approaches to dispute the authority of global liberal elites and transform political "common sense" throughout different countries and regions (Gheciu et al. 88-116)
.
Reviews in Political Science Quarterly and International Affairs of “The World of the (Far) Right: Cultural Foundations and Political Strategies at the Global Level”, redirects the academic conversation from perceiving radical conservatism as merely reactionary; instead, it emphasizes its cultural resilience, intellectual coherence, and strategic adaptability as a global phenomenon. This transnational viewpoint reveals how leaders from Trump to Viktor Orbán and others engage in coordinated political and ideological networks that surpass national boundaries. It provides a compelling and original analysis of the global far right, going beyond electoral performance and national case studies, the book examines the ideological foundations and cultural strategies that support the far right's success. Drawing on intellectual history and political sociology, the authors assert that the radical conservative right has established a coherent worldview, based on a critique of liberalism and sustained by a Gramscian-inspired counter-hegemonic project. The review underscores three key contributions of the volume: the strategic appropriation of Gramsci's thought, the far right's cultural activism through publishing and education, and the transnational collaboration among far-right parties, particularly within the European Parliament. While acknowledging internal divisions and national specificities, the book convincingly illustrates that the far right is increasingly global in its scope and ambitions. By taking the far right seriously as a subject of scholarly inquiry, World of the Right offers a valuable framework for understanding its ideological coherence and political strategies. The book is a significant read for both academics and policymakers who seek to comprehend and respond to the far right's escalating influence in contemporary global politics
(Bressanelli 34-66)
| [32] | Bressanelli, E. (2026). The world of the (far) right: Cultural foundations and political strategies at the global level. Political Science Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqaf153 |
[32]
.
2.4. Media, Discourse, and Political Communication
Communication studies yield critical insights into the ways radical right ideologies gain traction within public discourse. A recent computational investigation into media coverage during the 2024 European Parliament elections indicates that radical right parties received an inordinate level of visibility compared to their electoral performance. This structural media bias implies that mainstream outlets can enhance the presence of right-wing actors beyond their electoral capabilities, thereby influencing public perception and the dynamics of political competition.
This study “Cross-National Evidence of Disproportionate Media Visibility for the Radical Right in the 2024 European Elections”, presents a systematic comparative analysis of the media visibility of various political families during the 2024 European Parliament elections. We examined close to 21,500 unique news articles from prominent national outlets in Austria, Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Portugal countries with varied political contexts and differing levels of media trust. By combining computational techniques with human classification, we identified parties, political leaders, and groups from the URLs and titles of the articles, categorizing them according to European Parliament political families and broad political affiliations. A cross-country comparison reveals that the Mainstream and the Radical Right were mentioned more frequently than other political groups. Additionally, the Radical Right received disproportionate attention in relation to electoral results (from 2019 or 2024) and electoral projections, particularly in Austria, Germany, and Ireland. This imbalance became more pronounced in the final weeks of the campaign, when media influence on undecided voters is most significant. An analysis at the outlet level indicates that coverage of right-leaning entities was predominant across news sources, especially those with the highest traffic, suggesting a structural pattern rather than one specific to individual outlets. Media visibility is a vital resource, and this systematic mapping of online coverage illustrates how traditional media can contribute to structural inequalities in democratic competition
(Damiao et al. 112-134)
| [7] | Damião, Í., Franco, J., Silva, M., Almeida, P., Magalhães, P. C., & Gonçalves-Sá, J. (2026). Cross-national evidence of disproportionate media visibility for the radical right in the 2024 European elections. Preprint, arXiv:2601.05826.
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2601.05826 |
[7]
.
Communication studies of “Elite Political Discourse has become more toxic in Western Countries”, yield critical insights into the ways radical right ideologies gain traction within public discourse. A recent computational investigation into media coverage during the 2024 European Parliament elections indicates that radical right parties received an inordinate level of visibility compared to their electoral performance. This structural media bias implies that mainstream outlets can enhance the presence of right-wing actors beyond their electoral capabilities, thereby influencing public perception and the dynamics of political competition. This study presents a systematic comparative analysis of the media visibility of various political families during the 2024 European Parliament elections. We examined close to 21,500 unique news articles from prominent national outlets in Austria, Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Portugal countries with varied political contexts and differing levels of media trust. By combining computational techniques with human classification, we identified parties, political leaders, and groups from the URLs and titles of the articles, categorizing them according to European Parliament political families and broad political affiliations. A cross-country comparison reveals that the Mainstream and the Radical Right were mentioned more frequently than other political groups. Additionally, the Radical Right received disproportionate attention in relation to electoral results (from 2019 or 2024) and electoral projections, particularly in Austria, Germany, and Ireland. This imbalance became more pronounced in the final weeks of the campaign, when media influence on undecided voters is most significant. An analysis at the outlet level indicates that coverage of right-leaning entities was predominant across news sources, especially those with the highest traffic, suggesting a structural pattern rather than one specific to individual outlets. Media visibility is a vital resource, and this systematic mapping of online coverage illustrates how traditional media can contribute to structural inequalities in democratic competition (Tornberg and Chueri 512-523)
.
2.5. Critical Perspectives and Intersectionality
The article “White masculinity and the radical right in Europe: an intersectional analytical framework”, establishes an intersectional framework to examine the radical right in Europe, emphasizing the interconnected roles of white masculinity, race, and class in forming its identity, ideology, and power dynamics. Although much of the literature on the radical right focuses on nativism and populism, the author contends that these perspectives frequently overlook deeper structural aspects of race and gender, particularly the dominance of whiteness and male authority within party bases and leadership. By expanding upon existing models of gender and extremism, the paper incorporates a comprehensive intersectionality perspective to illustrate how normative categories such as masculinity and whiteness are often unmarked yet essential to radical right politics. This framework demonstrates that the ideological and organizational traits of the radical right cannot be fully comprehended without considering the interplay of status threat, privilege, and historical power relations across social categories. The article critically evaluates traditional explanations that simplify radical right support to economic grievances or basic masculinity metrics, showing that these frameworks fail to recognize how racialized gender identities play a role in political mobilization. It underscores that while men, especially white men, are disproportionately represented in radical right movements, this trend is more accurately explained by structural privileges and perceived threats to social dominance rather than solely individual traits. The analysis further reveals how modern radical right rhetoric appropriates feminist and LGBTQ+ themes for exclusionary purposes, highlighting the intricate ways in which gender and race are manipulated. The article concludes by advocating for more sophisticated theoretical frameworks that align material transformations under capitalism with intersectional perspectives on identity and power (Guildea 1)
.
2.6. Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approaches
The article “Right-wing populism in Europe & USA: Contesting politics & discourse beyond ‘Orbanism’ and ‘Trumpism”, highlights that in recent years and months, there has been a notable increase in information regarding the rise of right-wing populist parties (RWPs) in Europe and the USA, which has taken centre stage in the news and instigated electoral fears among mainstream institutions and politicians. The unpredictable successes of populists, such as Donald Trump in the USA in 2016, have transformed initial anxieties into substantial apprehension and fear. This Special Issue delves into the recent and sudden escalation of right-wing populism. It addresses a variety of contemporary challenges and numerous 'discursive shifts' as well as broader dynamics of media and public discourse that have emerged due to the rise of right-wing populism (RWP) across Europe and beyond. We explore not only the nature and current state of contemporary RWP but also point to its ontology within and beyond the political domain, arguing that the rise and success of RWP is certainly not a new or ephemeral phenomenon. Interdisciplinary collections, such as the Journal of Language and Politics special issue on right-wing populism, demonstrate the importance of discourse analysis and comparative frameworks for capturing the rhetorical strategies that connect Trumpism, Orbanism, and other right-wing movements. By emphasizing linguistic constructions and narrative frames, this research illustrates how right-wing populism operates through the strategic communication of opposing worldviews that define political competition as “us vs. them”
(Wodak and Krzyżanowski 471-484)
| [9] | Wodak, R., & Krzyżanowski, M. (2017). Right-wing populism in Europe and the USA: Contesting politics and discourse. Journal of Language and Politics, 16(4), 471-484.
https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.17042.krz |
[9]
.
3. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
The experts demonstrate that concepts such as the radical right, far right, right-wing populism, conservative nationalism, and traditional conservatism are closely related but analytically distinct. Even though these concepts are used interchangeably, despite important ideological differences, it causes confusion because each has its own sets of belief
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 6)
. Therefore, the present study conceptualizes contemporary radical right politics at the intersection of populism, nativism, authoritarian governance, and conservative nationalism. Rather than treating Trumpism, Orbánism, Melonism, AfD, National Rally, or Milei's libertarian conservatism as identical political models, they represent nationally distinct manifestations of a broader transnational ideological realignment. Despite differences in institutional settings, economic policies, and historical contexts, these movements converge around common themes of sovereignty, anti-globalism, cultural protectionism, executive centralization, and scepticism toward liberal international institutions.
To explain this transformation, the article integrates four complementary theoretical perspectives.
Following Mudde (Muddle 11-23)
| [1] | Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity Press. |
[1]
, the radical right is defined by three core ideas: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.
1) Nativism has become a central feature of contemporary radical right politics across Europe and beyond. It combines intense nationalism with the belief that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native national community and that non-native individuals or cultures constitute a threat to national cohesion (Muddle 27; Kitschelt and McGann 47-90)
| [1] | Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity Press. |
| [2] | Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108595841 |
| [3] | Kitschelt, H., & McGann, A. J. (1995). The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis. University of Michigan Press. |
[1-3]
.
2) Authoritarianism emphasizes strict control over law and order, strong leadership, and social discipline (Anderson 7; Brubaker 55-78)
| [11] | Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (Rev. ed.). Verso. |
| [12] | Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558764 |
[11, 12]
. It provides an analytical lens for understanding how national identity is politically constructed and strategically employed to redefine citizenship, belonging, sovereignty, and cultural legitimacy. This perspective explains why immigration, national history, religion, and border control have become dominant political issues across many contemporary democracies.
3) Populism Theory explains how political entrepreneurs mobilize anti-establishment sentiments by constructing a binary opposition between “the people” and “the elite”. This framework helps explain the electoral appeal of leaders such as Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, Giorgia Meloni, and Javier Milei. Populism frames politics as a moral struggle between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 6)
. Importantly, radical right parties generally accept democratic elections but challenge the liberal dimensions of democracy, including minority rights, judicial independence, media pluralism, and constitutional constraints.
By contrast, the far right or Democratic Backsliding and Competitive Authoritarianism
(Mudde 27; Levitsky and Ziblatt 72-96)
| [1] | Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity Press. |
| [2] | Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108595841 |
| [3] | Kitschelt, H., & McGann, A. J. (1995). The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis. University of Michigan Press. |
| [4] | Rueda, D. (2024). The rise of nationalist populism. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003517467 |
| [5] | Alexandre, N. R., & Christofoletti, R. (Eds.). (2025). The Palgrave handbook on right-wing populism and otherness in global perspective. Palgrave Macmillan.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-77868-1 |
| [6] | Gheciu, A., Narita, F., Vucetic, S., Williams, M. C., Drolet, J.-F., & Abrahamsen, R. (2024). World of the right: Radical conservatism and global order. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009516075 |
| [7] | Damião, Í., Franco, J., Silva, M., Almeida, P., Magalhães, P. C., & Gonçalves-Sá, J. (2026). Cross-national evidence of disproportionate media visibility for the radical right in the 2024 European elections. Preprint, arXiv:2601.05826.
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2601.05826 |
| [8] | Guildea, A. (2025). White masculinity and the radical right in Europe: An intersectional analytical framework. Frontiers in Sociology, 10, Article 1611191.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2025.1611191 |
| [9] | Wodak, R., & Krzyżanowski, M. (2017). Right-wing populism in Europe and the USA: Contesting politics and discourse. Journal of Language and Politics, 16(4), 471-484.
https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.17042.krz |
| [10] | Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190234874.001.0001 |
| [11] | Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (Rev. ed.). Verso. |
| [12] | Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558764 |
| [13] | Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5-19. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012 |
| [14] | Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die. Crown. |
[1-14]
, is more extreme ideological category that frequently rejects democratic institutions altogether or openly embraces authoritarian or anti-democratic alternatives. Some of these groups still has ties with fascist or neo-fascist traditions. Modern radical right parties prefer to sought legitimacy through electoral politics rather than revolutionary transformation by force
(Mudde 27)
| [1] | Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity Press. |
[1]
. The study explains how elected governments gradually weaken liberal democratic institutions without abolishing electoral competition. Rather than overthrowing democracy through military coups, contemporary radical right governments often consolidate executive authority incrementally through judicial reforms, restrictions on media independence, constitutional amendments, and the delegitimization of political opposition.
Mudde and Kaltwasser
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 6)
conceptualize populism as a mindset that pits “the good, everyday people” against a “corrupt self-serving elite”. It is a “thin-centred ideology” that divides society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the virtuous people and the corrupt elite. Since populism lacks a comprehensive ideological character, it can be attached to left-wing, right-wing, nationalist, socialist, or conservative political projects. Therefore, while many far-right groups use this “us vs them” message, to mobilize electoral support populism is itself a separate concept.
Similarly, conservative nationalism, emphasizes the preservation of national sovereignty, cultural traditions, historical identity, religion, and social order. They usually respect the existing democratic-system and do not rely on anger against the elites. Many conservative nationalist governments advocate stronger border control, national identity, and traditional social values (Kaufmann 21-45)
| [15] | Kaufmann, E. (2018). Whiteshift: Populism, immigration and the future of white majorities. Allen Lane. |
[15]
. Therefore, conservative nationalism should be viewed as a broader ideological tradition within which radical right politics may emerge but should not be conflated with it.
By integrating these four perspectives, the study develops a comprehensive analytical framework capable of explaining both domestic political developments and the emergence of transnational ideological cooperation among radical right actors. The framework further demonstrates that contemporary radical right politics should be understood not as isolated national phenomena but as interconnected political movements sharing common ideological narratives while adapting to diverse institutional contexts.
4. Research Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative comparative case study as an interpretivist political analysis to investigate the global realignment of contemporary conservatism and radical right politics during the 2020s. The research pursues to understand ideological transformation, political discourse, institutional change, and transnational political networking rather than establish causal relationships through statistical modelling, qualitative inquiry is considered the most appropriate methodological approach (Creswell and Creswell 3-21; George and Bennett 3-36)
| [16] | Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches (5th ed.). SAGE Publications. |
| [17] | George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. MIT Press. |
[16, 17]
.
The study employs a comparative politics framework combined with qualitative discourse analysis, document analysis, and process tracing to examine similarities and differences across contemporary radical right movements. This multi-method design enables systematic comparison across different political systems while identifying common ideological patterns, institutional strategies, and mechanisms of transnational diffusion.
4.1. Case Selection
The study adopts a purposive comparative case study design in which cases are selected according to three criteria:
1) Continued success in elections: The group keeps winning votes and elections regularly.
2) Real power in government: Direct influence on national policymaking through government participation or significant opposition status; and
3) Global teamwork: Evidence of participation in transnational conservative or radical right political networks. Based on these criteria, six primary comparative cases constitute the core empirical analysis:
4) United States - Donald Trump and the MAGA movement;
5) Hungary - Viktor Orbán and Fidesz;
6) Italy - Giorgia Meloni and Brothers of Italy;
7) France - Marine Le Pen and National Rally;
8) Germany - Alternative für Deutschland (AfD);
9) Argentina - Javier Milei and La Libertad Avanza.
These political situations represent different constitutional systems, electoral institutions, historical experiences, and regional contexts while sharing three common characteristics of string national pride, charismatic leadership, and criticism of global/liberal international institutions.
Countries like India, Austria, the Netherlands, and Brazil are discussed only as illustrative examples for broader conservative political narratives. The study does not look at them deeply and therefore do not form part of the principal empirical dataset.
4.2. Expanded Comparative Case Analysis
4.2.1. United States: Donald Trump and the MAGA Movement
Donald Trump's electoral victory in the 2024 U. S. presidential election, in which he secured 312 Electoral College votes compared with Kamala Harris's 226, demonstrated resilience of Trumpism despite multiple legal and political challenges. The Republican Party took full control of the presidency and both chambers of Congress, which made it much easier for them to put their “America First” policies into action.
Trump’s political movement focuses on strict immigration control, expanded deportation measures, heavy tariff policies, and pulling back from participation in multilateral institutions. Institutionally, increased executive centralization and repeated confrontations with the judiciary and federal bureaucracy has been highlighted. Internationally, Trumpism has become a major ideological reference point for conservative organizations through the
Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), which now hosts meetings across Europe and Latin America to help right-wing leaders share ideas
(Mudde 11-23; Levitsky and Ziblatt 65-67)
| [1] | Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity Press. |
| [2] | Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108595841 |
| [3] | Kitschelt, H., & McGann, A. J. (1995). The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis. University of Michigan Press. |
| [4] | Rueda, D. (2024). The rise of nationalist populism. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003517467 |
| [5] | Alexandre, N. R., & Christofoletti, R. (Eds.). (2025). The Palgrave handbook on right-wing populism and otherness in global perspective. Palgrave Macmillan.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-77868-1 |
| [6] | Gheciu, A., Narita, F., Vucetic, S., Williams, M. C., Drolet, J.-F., & Abrahamsen, R. (2024). World of the right: Radical conservatism and global order. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009516075 |
| [7] | Damião, Í., Franco, J., Silva, M., Almeida, P., Magalhães, P. C., & Gonçalves-Sá, J. (2026). Cross-national evidence of disproportionate media visibility for the radical right in the 2024 European elections. Preprint, arXiv:2601.05826.
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2601.05826 |
| [8] | Guildea, A. (2025). White masculinity and the radical right in Europe: An intersectional analytical framework. Frontiers in Sociology, 10, Article 1611191.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2025.1611191 |
| [9] | Wodak, R., & Krzyżanowski, M. (2017). Right-wing populism in Europe and the USA: Contesting politics and discourse. Journal of Language and Politics, 16(4), 471-484.
https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.17042.krz |
| [10] | Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190234874.001.0001 |
| [11] | Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (Rev. ed.). Verso. |
| [12] | Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558764 |
| [13] | Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5-19. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012 |
| [14] | Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die. Crown. |
[1-14]
.
4.2.2. Hungary: Viktor Orbán and Fidesz
Hungary represents one of the most institutionalized examples of contemporary illiberal democracy, a system where elections happen but government limits democratic freedom. In the
2022 parliamentary elections, Fidesz secured constitutional majority with
54 percent of the vote. Orbán's government made constitutional amendments, restructured judicial appointments, centralized media regulation, and strengthened executive authority to promote Christian nationalism and anti-immigration policies. Hungary has simultaneously emerged as an important hub of international conservative cooperation by hosting
CPAC Hungary, bringing together conservative politicians from Europe, North America, and Latin America. These developments illustrate how domestic institutional transformation increasingly intersects with transnational ideological networking (Wodak 1-20)
.
4.2.3. Italy: Giorgia Meloni and Brothers of Italy
Brothers of Italy became Italy's largest political party during the 2022 general election, receiving approximately 26 percent of the national vote, enabling Giorgia Meloni to become Italy's first female Prime Minister.
Meloni's government has prioritized stricter migration policies, border security, demographic incentives, and national sovereignty while maintaining Italy's commitments within NATO and the European Union. Although her party has moderated some historical associations with post-fascism, it continues to emphasize traditional family values, cultural identity, and conservative nationalism.
Meloni has strengthened cooperation with European Conservative and Reformist (ECR) parties and actively participates in international conservative forums, demonstrating the increasing institutionalization of transnational conservative cooperation.
4.2.4 Germany: Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)
Germany's AfD has experienced unprecedented electoral growth. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, AfD got 15.9 percent of the vote despite internal controversies. Although excluded from federal government, AfD has substantially influenced German political discourse on immigration, asylum policy, energy security, and national identity.
Even without holding direct power, the AfD has managed to push mainstream political parties to adopt parts of its policies. Additionally, the AfD works closely with similar groups across Europe by sharing ideas, teaming up in parliament, and attending meetings, which proves that right-wing ideas easily spread across different countries.
4.2.5. France: Marine Le Pen and National Rally
Marine Le Pen has transformed National Rally through a strategy of "de-demonization," broadening its electoral appeal beyond traditional far-right constituencies.
During the 2024 French legislative elections, National Rally emerged as one of the country's strongest political forces, demonstrating the continued normalization of radical right politics.
Policy priorities include immigration restriction, national preference in welfare, enhanced border security, and greater national sovereignty within the European Union. National Rally also maintains extensive cooperation with other European nationalist parties through parliamentary networks and international conservative conferences.
4.2.6. Argentina: Javier Milei
Javier Milei won Argentina's 2023 presidential election with approximately 55.7 percent of the second-round vote.
Unlike European radical right parties, Milei combines economic libertarianism with anti-establishment populism. His government has introduced extensive fiscal austerity measures, deregulation, reductions in public expenditure, and state restructuring.
Institutionally, Milei relies heavily upon personalized leadership and anti-elite political communication while increasingly engaging with international conservative organizations, including CPAC events, thereby connecting Latin American conservatism with broader transnational radical right networks.
4.3. Data Sources
The analysis relies exclusively on secondary qualitative data collected from multiple authoritative sources to ensure triangulation and analytical reliability.
Primary documentary materials include official speeches, party manifestos, government policy documents, parliamentary statements, CPAC and National Conservatism (NatCon) conference proceedings, electoral statistics, and voting data from recent elections, including the 2024 European Parliament elections.
Secondary sources include peer-reviewed journal articles, scholarly books, comparative datasets, reports published by international organizations, think tanks, and reputable policy institutions addressing radical right politics, democratic backsliding, media discourse, populism, nationalism, and international relations.
5. Analytical Framework
The empirical analysis is organised around five analytical dimensions.
First, ideological orientation examines nativism, nationalism, populism, authoritarianism, sovereignty, and anti-globalism.
Second, political leadership evaluates charismatic leadership, personalization of executive authority, anti-elite rhetoric, and political communication strategies.
Third, democratic governance investigates the relationship between radical right governments and constitutional institutions, judicial independence, electoral competition, media freedom, and civil liberties.
Fourth, international orientation analyses attitudes towards multilateral institutions, globalization, immigration, foreign policy, and international organizations.
Finally, transnational networking examines ideological diffusion through conferences such as CPAC and NatCon, political alliances, media cooperation, and cross-border conservative organizations.
Qualitative discourse analysis is employed to examine speeches, policy documents, campaign narratives, and elite political communication to identify recurring ideological themes concerning national sovereignty, migration, cultural identity, globalization, and democratic legitimacy. Comparative case analysis then identifies similarities and variations across national contexts while recognizing institutional and historical differences.
To strengthen validity, the study employs triangulation, comparing findings derived from political speeches, electoral outcomes, scholarly literature, comparative media analyses, and official policy documents. Triangulation reduces the limitations associated with any single source of evidence and enhances the credibility of qualitative interpretation (Yin 53-67)
| [19] | Yin, R. K. (2018). Case study research and applications: Design and methods (6th ed.). SAGE Publications. |
[19]
.
6. Comparative Case Analysis Table
Table 1. Comparative analysis of six primary cases.
Case | Electoral Performance | Core Ideology | Major Policy Measures | Institutional Change | International Orientation | Transnational Networking |
United States (Trump) | Won 2024 Presidential Election (312 Electoral Votes) | Nationalist Populism | Immigration restrictions, tariffs, America First | Expanded executive authority | Skeptical of multilateralism | CPAC International |
Hungary (Orbán) | 54% vote share (2022) | Illiberal Conservatism | Anti-immigration, constitutional reforms | Judicial and media centralization | Sovereignty-centered EU policy | CPAC Hungary |
Italy (Meloni) | 26% vote share (2022) | Conservative Nationalism | Migration control, family policies | Executive consolidation | Pro-NATO, reformist EU stance | European Conservatives and Reformists |
Germany (AfD) | 15.9% (2024 European Election) | Nationalist Populism | Immigration, energy security | Agenda-setting influence | Eurosceptic | European parliamentary alliances |
France (National Rally) | Major gains in 2024 Legislative Elections | Nationalist Populism | Border security, welfare nationalism | Electoral mainstreaming | National sovereignty | European nationalist cooperation |
Argentina (Milei) | 55.7% runoff victory (2023) | Libertarian Populism | Fiscal austerity, deregulation | Presidential centralization | Market-oriented nationalism | CPAC Latin America |
Comparative Findings
The structured comparison reveals five major patterns.
First, despite important ideological variations, all six movements prioritize national sovereignty, cultural identity, and immigration control as central components of political mobilization.
Second, each movement relies heavily on personalized leadership, reinforcing direct relationships between political leaders and citizens while criticizing established political elites and intermediary institutions.
Third, although all continue to participate in democratic elections, they differ in their approaches toward liberal democratic institutions, ranging from agenda-setting influence in Germany to constitutional restructuring in Hungary.
Fourth, their foreign policy orientations combine varying degrees of nationalism and scepticism toward multilateral governance, although Italy demonstrates greater institutional moderation because of its commitments within NATO and the European Union.
Finally, and most significantly, all six movements increasingly participate in transnational conservative networks, including CPAC, National Conservatism (NatCon), European parliamentary alliances, and cross-border policy forums. This finding demonstrates that contemporary radical right politics is no longer simply a collection of isolated national movements but rather constitutes a transnational ideological ecosystem characterized by the diffusion of narratives, organizational learning, and strategic political cooperation.
These comparative findings directly support the central argument of this article that the contemporary radical right has undergone a process of simultaneous national institutionalization and transnational consolidation, reshaping democratic politics and challenging key assumptions of the liberal international order.
7. Synthesis and Research Implications
7.1. The Erosion of Multilateralism and Liberal International Norms
Reports from, “Populism and the liberal international order: An analysis of UN voting patterns “suggest that populist and radical right actors play a significant role in shaping foreign policy preferences that weaken the liberal international order. A quantitative examination of state behaviour indicates that populism is linked to a decrease in support for multilateralism, international cooperation, and global governance norms (such as the readiness to endorse UN-led initiatives and liberal trade commitments). Leaders with radical right or anti-globalist perspectives systematically challenge the prevailing consensus on liberal internationalism and emphasize unilateral actions
(Destradi and Vüllers 1073-1077)
.
Right-wing populist administrations have increasingly challenged UN-affiliated multilateralism by emphasizing national sovereignty over collective governance. Under the Trump administration in the United States (2017-2021), the "America First" policy led to withdrawals from UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council, the Paris Agreement, and the World Health Organization, indicating skepticism towards global institutional constraints.
Hungary, led by Viktor Orbán, has similarly resisted UN-supported migration frameworks and restricted the operations of foreign-funded NGOs, portraying civil society as a threat to national autonomy. In the United Kingdom, the Johnson government (2019-2022), influenced by populism from the Brexit era, cut back on foreign aid contributions, including funding for UN initiatives.
Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) employed sovereignty rhetoric to deflect international criticism regarding environmental and human rights issues, often depicting UN institutions as elite-driven and intrusive. In these cases, right-wing populist leaders generally view multilateral engagement as costly and misaligned with national interests, a trend that is evident in the reduced financial and political support for UN peacekeeping and broader international collaboration.
7.2. Transnational Networks and the "Reactionary International"
Citing’s from “Dynamics of far-right trans-nationalisation in Europe”, shows that documentation of transnational networking among illiberal and radical right entities is on the rise. Investigations into the trans nationalization of far-right movements reveal that these groups utilize conferences, social media, and international collaborations to disseminate strategic frameworks and campaign models especially concerning anti-immigrant and anti-gender rights topics
(Zanotti et al. 3-6)
| [21] | Zanotti, L., Villalobos-Machuca, F., & Roldán Duque, F. (2025). Echoes without integration: Strategic resonance and the limits of radical right transnationalism. Política y Sociedad, 62(2), e99134. https://doi.org/10.5209/poso.99134 |
[21]
. A significant study focusing on radical-right international networks underscores the magnitude of these initiatives: between 2000 and 2024, these factions have orchestrated hundreds of conferences that engaged thousands of activists and speakers from numerous countries demonstrating a tangible, persistent "illiberal international (Zanotti et al. 3-6)
| [21] | Zanotti, L., Villalobos-Machuca, F., & Roldán Duque, F. (2025). Echoes without integration: Strategic resonance and the limits of radical right transnationalism. Política y Sociedad, 62(2), e99134. https://doi.org/10.5209/poso.99134 |
[21]
.
Recent reports show that the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) has transformed from a domestic U. S. forum into a transnational platform for right-wing political coordination. Over the past decade, CPAC has expanded to countries such as Hungary, Brazil, Argentina, Japan, Australia, and Mexico, facilitating cross-border networking among conservative elites. Although framed as “anti-globalist,” these conferences paradoxically construct a global infrastructure to disseminate shared ideological agendas, including opposition to immigration, LGBTQ+ rights, climate policy, and so-called “woke” politics. High-profile figures such as Viktor Orbán, Javier Milei, and Donald Trump have reinforced ideological cohesion and strategic alignment. CPAC events also normalize previously fringe positions, provide spaces for sharing political and media strategies, and foster solidarity among right-wing leaders confronting legal or political challenges. Closely aligned with the National Conservatism (NatCon) movement, CPAC reflects a broader realignment of global populism, linking European and American far-right actors within an increasingly organized international network
(Silverman 23-39)
.
7.3. Media Visibility, Discourse, and Political Norms
New comparative studies reveal that radical right parties in Europe experienced an exceptionally high degree of media visibility during the 2024 European Parliament elections, far exceeding what their vote shares would typically indicate a phenomenon that enhances their political relevance and legitimacy. This research provides a thorough comparative analysis of the media visibility of various political families during the 2024 European Parliament elections. After examined close to 21,500 unique news articles from leading national media in Austria, Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Portugal countries with varying political landscapes and levels of media trust and by combining computational techniques with human classification, the identified parties, political leaders, and groups from the URLs and titles of the articles, categorizing them according to European Parliament political families and general political affiliations. Cross-country comparisons demonstrate that the Mainstream and the Radical Right were referenced more frequently than other political groups. Additionally, the Radical Right received disproportionate media attention relative to electoral results (from 2019 or 2024) and electoral predictions, especially in Austria, Germany, and Ireland. This imbalance became more pronounced in the final weeks of the campaign, when media influence on undecided voters is most significant. An analysis at the outlet level shows that coverage of right-leaning entities was predominant across news sources, particularly those with the highest traffic, indicating a structural bias
(Damião et al. 11-14)
| [7] | Damião, Í., Franco, J., Silva, M., Almeida, P., Magalhães, P. C., & Gonçalves-Sá, J. (2026). Cross-national evidence of disproportionate media visibility for the radical right in the 2024 European elections. Preprint, arXiv:2601.05826.
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2601.05826 |
[7]
.
The rise of toxic and uncivil politics is increasingly perceived as a significant threat to democratic principles and governance. However, our comprehension of the factors driving and the progression of political incivility is still quite limited. Utilizing a unique dataset comprising nearly 18 million Twitter messages from parliamentarians across 17 countries over a span of five years, this paper conducts a thorough examination of whether political discourse globally is becoming more uncivil, as well as identifying the factors contributing to political incivility. Our findings indicate a notable rise in toxic rhetoric among political elites, which is linked to radical-right parties and opposition parties. Interestingly, toxicity saw a considerable decline during the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic and, unexpectedly, during election periods. Additionally, our analysis shows that posts addressing 'culture war' issues, such as migration and LGBTQ+ rights, exhibit significantly higher levels of toxicity compared to discussions centered on welfare or economic matters. These results highlight a concerning trend in international democracies towards a deterioration of constructive democratic dialogue
(Törnberg and Chueri 3-4)
.
Misinformation & Radical Right Strategy: Investigations into misinformation demonstrate that far-right populist politicians are considerably more inclined than their left-wing counterparts to disseminate false information online, employing this tactic as a strategic means to polarize voters and undermine democratic principles
(Törnberg and Chueri 4-6)
.
7.4. Democratic Backsliding & Mainstream Party Normalization
Empirical studies
(Arzheimer 535-540)
“German far right setting agenda as opponents amplify its ideas, study finds”, reveal that mainstream parties across Europe even those that have historically upheld liberal democratic values are increasingly adopting or mirroring far-right rhetoric, prioritizing issues such as migration and national identity in ways that support radical right agendas. This shift has legitimized extremist concepts in public discussions. A scholarly study “In Europe, Democracy Erodes from the Right”, further indicates that the tolerance of illiberal politicians among certain voter segments contributes to the erosion of democracy, particularly in areas where civic anxiety about migration and uncertainty regarding democratic processes are prevalent
(Svolik et al. 17–20)
| [26] | Svolik, M. W., Avramovska, E., Lutz, J., & Milačić, F. (2023). In Europe, democracy erodes from the right. Journal of Democracy, 34(1), 5-20. |
[26]
.
Germany & AfD: Empirical analysis in “German politics froze out the far right for years -is this about to change?”, has recorded instances of cooperation between traditional conservative parties (e.g., CDU) and far-right groups at local levels, signalling a deterioration of historical political norms that once excluded extremist parties
(Arzheimer 535-540)
.
7.5. Geopolitical Realignments & Illiberal Foreign Policy Emerging
Recent analyses in academia “The Illiberal International: Authoritarian
Cooperation Is Reshaping the Global Order” and policy circles depict the ascent of not only isolated right-wing parties but also more extensive coalitions of illiberal actors spanning states and movements, a development that some scholars now label as an "Illiberal International." Although these actors are ideologically varied, they unite in their shared opposition to liberal democratic governance and their coordinated methods of influence
(McNeil, Spike, and Corbet)
.
7.6. Fractured Transatlantic Nationalism
The mainstream alliances among radical right conservatives in the realm of foreign policy are currently under pressure, as illustrated by the recent conflicts between MAGA-aligned U. S. representatives and European nationalists over issues such as Greenland and trade agreements, showcasing the boundaries of ideological unity (McNeil, Spike, and Corbet)
.
7.7. Loosely Organized Yet Increasingly Influential Transnational Ideological Bloc
The convergence of Trumpism with European and non-Western conservative nationalisms illustrates the formation of a loosely coordinated transnational ideological bloc defined by sovereigntism, cultural protectionism, and opposition to liberal globalism. Trump’s populist-nationalist model characterized by anti-elite rhetoric, migration restrictions, media delegitimization, and skepticism towards multilateral institutions has resonated significantly with European leaders such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Giorgia Meloni in Italy, who explicitly advocate for 'illiberal' or post-liberal alternatives to liberal democracy
(Muddle 11-23)
| [1] | Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity Press. |
[1]
. Similar ideological connections are evident beyond the Western world. In India, the Hindu nationalist politics under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) reflect Trumpist themes through the construction of a culturally threatened nation, the marginalization of minorities, and resistance to international human rights scrutiny, while still strategically engaging with global economic and geopolitical structures
(Jaffrelot 74-111)
.
Rather than creating a formal alliance, these actors represent a diffuse ideological ecosystem that mutually legitimizes illiberal governance practices and contributes to the erosion of liberal democratic and multilateral norms on a global scale.
8. Disclosure Statement
The author declares that there are no competing financial, professional, or personal interests that could have influenced the research, authorship, or publication of this article.
9. Generative AI Statement
The author used generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools solely to assist with language editing, grammar refinement, and improving the clarity and organization of the manuscript. All research design, literature review, data interpretation, analysis, arguments, and conclusions were conceived, verified, and approved by the author, who accepts full responsibility for the content of the manuscript.
10. Conclusions
10.1. Consolidation of a Transnational Radical Right Ecosystem
The study shows that radical right movements in the 2020s have progressed into a transnational ideological ecosystem, aided by conferences like CPAC and National Conservatism (NatCon), which act as hubs for elite coordination, agenda-setting, and strategic dissemination
(Gheciu et al. 88-116; Silverman 23-39)
| [6] | Gheciu, A., Narita, F., Vucetic, S., Williams, M. C., Drolet, J.-F., & Abrahamsen, R. (2024). World of the right: Radical conservatism and global order. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009516075 |
| [7] | Damião, Í., Franco, J., Silva, M., Almeida, P., Magalhães, P. C., & Gonçalves-Sá, J. (2026). Cross-national evidence of disproportionate media visibility for the radical right in the 2024 European elections. Preprint, arXiv:2601.05826.
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2601.05826 |
| [8] | Guildea, A. (2025). White masculinity and the radical right in Europe: An intersectional analytical framework. Frontiers in Sociology, 10, Article 1611191.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2025.1611191 |
| [9] | Wodak, R., & Krzyżanowski, M. (2017). Right-wing populism in Europe and the USA: Contesting politics and discourse. Journal of Language and Politics, 16(4), 471-484.
https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.17042.krz |
| [10] | Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190234874.001.0001 |
| [11] | Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (Rev. ed.). Verso. |
| [12] | Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558764 |
| [13] | Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5-19. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012 |
| [14] | Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die. Crown. |
| [15] | Kaufmann, E. (2018). Whiteshift: Populism, immigration and the future of white majorities. Allen Lane. |
| [16] | Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches (5th ed.). SAGE Publications. |
| [17] | George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. MIT Press. |
| [18] | Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean. SAGE Publications.
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446270073 |
| [19] | Yin, R. K. (2018). Case study research and applications: Design and methods (6th ed.). SAGE Publications. |
| [20] | Destradi, S., & Vüllers, J. (2024). Populism and the liberal international order: An analysis of UN voting patterns. The Review of International Organizations.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09569-w |
| [21] | Zanotti, L., Villalobos-Machuca, F., & Roldán Duque, F. (2025). Echoes without integration: Strategic resonance and the limits of radical right transnationalism. Política y Sociedad, 62(2), e99134. https://doi.org/10.5209/poso.99134 |
| [22] | Froio, C., & Ganesh, B. (2019). The transnationalisation of far right discourse on Twitter: Issues and actors that cross borders in Western European democracies. European Societies, 21(4), 513–539. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295 |
| [23] | Silverman, G. (2025). Rallying the troops: CPAC and the international far right. Journal of Illiberalism Studies, 5(3), 23-39. https://doi.org/10.53483/ZCRU3610 |
| [24] | Törnberg, P., & Chueri, J. (2025). Elite political discourse has become more toxic in Western countries. arXiv preprint, arXiv:2503.22411. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2503.22411 |
| [25] | Saldivia Gonzatti, D., & Völker, T. (2026). Far-right agenda setting: How the far right influences the political mainstream. European Journal of Political Research, 65(1), 101-123. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1475676525100066 |
| [26] | Svolik, M. W., Avramovska, E., Lutz, J., & Milačić, F. (2023). In Europe, democracy erodes from the right. Journal of Democracy, 34(1), 5-20. |
| [27] | Arzheimer, K. (2015). The AfD: Finally a successful right-wing populist Eurosceptic party for Germany? West European Politics, 38(3), 535-556.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1004230 |
| [28] | Cheeseman, N., Bianchi, M., & Cyr, J. (2025). The illiberal international: Authoritarian cooperation and the remaking of global order. International Affairs, 101(2), 345-362. |
| [29] | McNeil, S., Spike, J., & Corbet, S. (2026, January 25). Trump’s Greenland ambitions strain MAGA ties with Europe’s far-right. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/trump-greenland-europe-far-right-maga-c6b44e151d81e990129c2d58ab0ee192 |
| [30] | Jaffrelot, C. (2021). Modi’s India: Hindu nationalism and the rise of ethnic democracy. Princeton University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691223094 |
| [31] | Silverman, J. (2025). CPAC and the globalization of American conservatism. Foreign Policy Analysis, 21(3), 1-19. |
[6-31]
. These forums institutionalize cross-national collaboration while retaining national political connections.
10.2. Selective Globalism and the Reconfiguration of Sovereignty
Despite their anti-globalist rhetoric, radical right actors are actively involved in selective internationalism, dismissing liberal multilateralism while establishing alternative global networks based on sovereignty, cultural majoritarianism and executive authority
(Rueda 1-9; Bressanelli)
| [4] | Rueda, D. (2024). The rise of nationalist populism. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003517467 |
| [5] | Alexandre, N. R., & Christofoletti, R. (Eds.). (2025). The Palgrave handbook on right-wing populism and otherness in global perspective. Palgrave Macmillan.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-77868-1 |
| [6] | Gheciu, A., Narita, F., Vucetic, S., Williams, M. C., Drolet, J.-F., & Abrahamsen, R. (2024). World of the right: Radical conservatism and global order. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009516075 |
| [7] | Damião, Í., Franco, J., Silva, M., Almeida, P., Magalhães, P. C., & Gonçalves-Sá, J. (2026). Cross-national evidence of disproportionate media visibility for the radical right in the 2024 European elections. Preprint, arXiv:2601.05826.
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2601.05826 |
| [8] | Guildea, A. (2025). White masculinity and the radical right in Europe: An intersectional analytical framework. Frontiers in Sociology, 10, Article 1611191.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2025.1611191 |
| [9] | Wodak, R., & Krzyżanowski, M. (2017). Right-wing populism in Europe and the USA: Contesting politics and discourse. Journal of Language and Politics, 16(4), 471-484.
https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.17042.krz |
| [10] | Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190234874.001.0001 |
| [11] | Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (Rev. ed.). Verso. |
| [12] | Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558764 |
| [13] | Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5-19. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012 |
| [14] | Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die. Crown. |
| [15] | Kaufmann, E. (2018). Whiteshift: Populism, immigration and the future of white majorities. Allen Lane. |
| [16] | Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches (5th ed.). SAGE Publications. |
| [17] | George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. MIT Press. |
| [18] | Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean. SAGE Publications.
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446270073 |
| [19] | Yin, R. K. (2018). Case study research and applications: Design and methods (6th ed.). SAGE Publications. |
| [20] | Destradi, S., & Vüllers, J. (2024). Populism and the liberal international order: An analysis of UN voting patterns. The Review of International Organizations.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09569-w |
| [21] | Zanotti, L., Villalobos-Machuca, F., & Roldán Duque, F. (2025). Echoes without integration: Strategic resonance and the limits of radical right transnationalism. Política y Sociedad, 62(2), e99134. https://doi.org/10.5209/poso.99134 |
| [22] | Froio, C., & Ganesh, B. (2019). The transnationalisation of far right discourse on Twitter: Issues and actors that cross borders in Western European democracies. European Societies, 21(4), 513–539. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295 |
| [23] | Silverman, G. (2025). Rallying the troops: CPAC and the international far right. Journal of Illiberalism Studies, 5(3), 23-39. https://doi.org/10.53483/ZCRU3610 |
| [24] | Törnberg, P., & Chueri, J. (2025). Elite political discourse has become more toxic in Western countries. arXiv preprint, arXiv:2503.22411. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2503.22411 |
| [25] | Saldivia Gonzatti, D., & Völker, T. (2026). Far-right agenda setting: How the far right influences the political mainstream. European Journal of Political Research, 65(1), 101-123. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1475676525100066 |
| [26] | Svolik, M. W., Avramovska, E., Lutz, J., & Milačić, F. (2023). In Europe, democracy erodes from the right. Journal of Democracy, 34(1), 5-20. |
| [27] | Arzheimer, K. (2015). The AfD: Finally a successful right-wing populist Eurosceptic party for Germany? West European Politics, 38(3), 535-556.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1004230 |
| [28] | Cheeseman, N., Bianchi, M., & Cyr, J. (2025). The illiberal international: Authoritarian cooperation and the remaking of global order. International Affairs, 101(2), 345-362. |
| [29] | McNeil, S., Spike, J., & Corbet, S. (2026, January 25). Trump’s Greenland ambitions strain MAGA ties with Europe’s far-right. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/trump-greenland-europe-far-right-maga-c6b44e151d81e990129c2d58ab0ee192 |
| [30] | Jaffrelot, C. (2021). Modi’s India: Hindu nationalism and the rise of ethnic democracy. Princeton University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691223094 |
| [31] | Silverman, J. (2025). CPAC and the globalization of American conservatism. Foreign Policy Analysis, 21(3), 1-19. |
| [32] | Bressanelli, E. (2026). The world of the (far) right: Cultural foundations and political strategies at the global level. Political Science Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqaf153 |
[4-32]
. This paradox reinterprets sovereignty as being compatible with ideological globalization.
10.3. Democratic Normalization and Electoral Legitimacy
In modern times, radical right movements are increasingly obtaining power from democratic frameworks rather than through clear authoritarian disruptions. The electoral achievements of the AfD in Germany, the National Rally in France, Brothers of Italy under Giorgia Meloni, and Javier Milei’s presidency in Argentina demonstrate how illiberal agendas gain acceptance through electoral legitimacy
(Kirby; Kassam)
| [33] | Kirby, Paul. “German Politics Froze Out the Far Right for Years - Is This About to Change?” BBC News, 25 Feb. 2025. |
| [34] | Kassam, Aamna. “German Far Right Sets Agenda as Opponents Amplify Its Ideas.” The Guardian, 2025. |
[33, 34]
.
10.4. Media Visibility as a Fundamental Political Asset
Disproportionate media exposure and heightened political toxicity enhance the influence of the radical right beyond their electoral power, hastening the spread of their agenda and altering political discourse throughout democracies
(Damião et al. 11-14; Kirby)
| [7] | Damião, Í., Franco, J., Silva, M., Almeida, P., Magalhães, P. C., & Gonçalves-Sá, J. (2026). Cross-national evidence of disproportionate media visibility for the radical right in the 2024 European elections. Preprint, arXiv:2601.05826.
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2601.05826 |
| [8] | Guildea, A. (2025). White masculinity and the radical right in Europe: An intersectional analytical framework. Frontiers in Sociology, 10, Article 1611191.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2025.1611191 |
| [9] | Wodak, R., & Krzyżanowski, M. (2017). Right-wing populism in Europe and the USA: Contesting politics and discourse. Journal of Language and Politics, 16(4), 471-484.
https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.17042.krz |
| [10] | Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190234874.001.0001 |
| [11] | Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (Rev. ed.). Verso. |
| [12] | Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558764 |
| [13] | Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5-19. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012 |
| [14] | Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die. Crown. |
| [15] | Kaufmann, E. (2018). Whiteshift: Populism, immigration and the future of white majorities. Allen Lane. |
| [16] | Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches (5th ed.). SAGE Publications. |
| [17] | George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. MIT Press. |
| [18] | Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean. SAGE Publications.
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446270073 |
| [19] | Yin, R. K. (2018). Case study research and applications: Design and methods (6th ed.). SAGE Publications. |
| [20] | Destradi, S., & Vüllers, J. (2024). Populism and the liberal international order: An analysis of UN voting patterns. The Review of International Organizations.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09569-w |
| [21] | Zanotti, L., Villalobos-Machuca, F., & Roldán Duque, F. (2025). Echoes without integration: Strategic resonance and the limits of radical right transnationalism. Política y Sociedad, 62(2), e99134. https://doi.org/10.5209/poso.99134 |
| [22] | Froio, C., & Ganesh, B. (2019). The transnationalisation of far right discourse on Twitter: Issues and actors that cross borders in Western European democracies. European Societies, 21(4), 513–539. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295 |
| [23] | Silverman, G. (2025). Rallying the troops: CPAC and the international far right. Journal of Illiberalism Studies, 5(3), 23-39. https://doi.org/10.53483/ZCRU3610 |
| [24] | Törnberg, P., & Chueri, J. (2025). Elite political discourse has become more toxic in Western countries. arXiv preprint, arXiv:2503.22411. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2503.22411 |
| [25] | Saldivia Gonzatti, D., & Völker, T. (2026). Far-right agenda setting: How the far right influences the political mainstream. European Journal of Political Research, 65(1), 101-123. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1475676525100066 |
| [26] | Svolik, M. W., Avramovska, E., Lutz, J., & Milačić, F. (2023). In Europe, democracy erodes from the right. Journal of Democracy, 34(1), 5-20. |
| [27] | Arzheimer, K. (2015). The AfD: Finally a successful right-wing populist Eurosceptic party for Germany? West European Politics, 38(3), 535-556.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1004230 |
| [28] | Cheeseman, N., Bianchi, M., & Cyr, J. (2025). The illiberal international: Authoritarian cooperation and the remaking of global order. International Affairs, 101(2), 345-362. |
| [29] | McNeil, S., Spike, J., & Corbet, S. (2026, January 25). Trump’s Greenland ambitions strain MAGA ties with Europe’s far-right. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/trump-greenland-europe-far-right-maga-c6b44e151d81e990129c2d58ab0ee192 |
| [30] | Jaffrelot, C. (2021). Modi’s India: Hindu nationalism and the rise of ethnic democracy. Princeton University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691223094 |
| [31] | Silverman, J. (2025). CPAC and the globalization of American conservatism. Foreign Policy Analysis, 21(3), 1-19. |
| [32] | Bressanelli, E. (2026). The world of the (far) right: Cultural foundations and political strategies at the global level. Political Science Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqaf153 |
| [33] | Kirby, Paul. “German Politics Froze Out the Far Right for Years - Is This About to Change?” BBC News, 25 Feb. 2025. |
[7-33]
. Consequently, media systems operate as unintentional facilitators of illiberal normalization.
10.5. Erosion of Liberal Multilateralism
There is a correlation between radical right governance and a diminishing support for UN-associated institutions and global governance standards. The United States, Hungary, Brazil, and the United Kingdom have demonstrated this shift through their withdrawals and funding reductions, indicating a significant move towards unilateralism and a foreign policy that prioritizes sovereignty
(Destradi and Vüllers 1057-1059)
.
10.6. Emergence of Illiberal International
The findings lend credence to the idea of an emerging Illiberal International, characterized as a loose coalition of states and movements that work together to contest liberal democratic norms while steering clear of formal alliances (Cheeseman et al. 46-57)
. This development signifies a persistent challenge to the liberal order that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War.
10.7. Internal Contradictions and Strategic Limits
Although there is ideological alignment, disagreements over trade, geopolitics, and national interests, especially within transatlantic nationalist alliances uncover the structural limitations of radical right solidarity, suggesting a focus on strategic cooperation instead of complete ideological harmony
(Silverman 23-39)
.
10.8. Implications for Democratic Resilience and Global Order
The merging of electoral legitimacy, media amplification, and transnational coordination creates a long-standing challenge to democratic values and liberal internationalism. To address this, it is essential to implement institutional safeguards, ensure media accountability, and foster renewed democratic narratives that can resist illiberal mobilization (Wodak and Krzyżanowski 471-484)
| [9] | Wodak, R., & Krzyżanowski, M. (2017). Right-wing populism in Europe and the USA: Contesting politics and discourse. Journal of Language and Politics, 16(4), 471-484.
https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.17042.krz |
[9]
.
11. Research Implications
11.1. Theoretical Advancement
1) Integrated ideological frameworks: Future research should combine discursive, organisational, and identity-based models to capture the multifaceted nature of radical right politics, moving beyond single-factor explanations such as economic distress or media exposure.
2) Transnational political space: The evidence supports theorising radical rightism not as isolated national phenomena but as interconnected transnational movements with shared narratives and strategic alliances, suggesting a need for frameworks that bridge comparative politics, international relations, and cultural sociology.
11.2. Methodological Innovations
1) Mixed-method approaches: The intersection of computational text analysis (e.g., media visibility, toxic discourse) with qualitative discourse analysis allows for multi-level insights into how rhetoric shapes political opportunity structures and voter perceptions.
2) Longitudinal data models: To understand sustained trends, longitudinal studies tracing media visibility, toxic discourse patterns, and election outcomes over time will help identify causal mechanisms of radical right influence.
11.3. Policy and Democratic Resilience
1) Institutional safeguards: The documented link between radical right discourse and democratic erosion highlights the need for policy frameworks that strengthen media literacy, combat political incivility, and protect democratic deliberation.
2) Party adaptation and response: Traditional parties, both center-right and center-left, must reassess strategic responses to populist rhetoric, as imitation, isolation, or outright opposition each carry distinct political consequences.
Abbreviations
AfD | Alternative Fur Detschland |
AI | Artificial Intelligence |
BJP | Bhartiya Janata Party |
CPAC | Conservative Political Action Conference |
EU | European Union |
LGBTQ+ | Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer/Questioning and Other Sexual Identities |
MAGA | Make America Great Again |
NatCon | National Conservatism |
NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
UN | United Nations |
RWP | Right Wing Populism |
ECR | European Conservative Reformist |
NatCon | National Conservatism |
Author Contributions
Amara Sehar Qureshi: Conceptualization, Formal Analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing
Conflicts of Interest
The author declares no conflict of interest.
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Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (Rev. ed.). Verso.
|
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Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press.
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|
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Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5-19.
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012
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Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die. Crown.
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Kaufmann, E. (2018). Whiteshift: Populism, immigration and the future of white majorities. Allen Lane.
|
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Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches (5th ed.). SAGE Publications.
|
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George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. MIT Press.
|
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Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean. SAGE Publications.
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446270073
|
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Yin, R. K. (2018). Case study research and applications: Design and methods (6th ed.). SAGE Publications.
|
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Destradi, S., & Vüllers, J. (2024). Populism and the liberal international order: An analysis of UN voting patterns. The Review of International Organizations.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09569-w
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Zanotti, L., Villalobos-Machuca, F., & Roldán Duque, F. (2025). Echoes without integration: Strategic resonance and the limits of radical right transnationalism. Política y Sociedad, 62(2), e99134.
https://doi.org/10.5209/poso.99134
|
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https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494295
|
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https://doi.org/10.53483/ZCRU3610
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Törnberg, P., & Chueri, J. (2025). Elite political discourse has become more toxic in Western countries. arXiv preprint, arXiv:2503.22411.
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2503.22411
|
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https://doi.org/10.1017/S1475676525100066
|
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APA Style
Qureshi, A. S. (2026). Radical Rightism and the Global Realignment of Contemporary Conservatism in the 2020s: Trump’s 2025 Presidency and the Transnational Global Right. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 9(3), 211-223. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.18
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Qureshi, A. S. Radical Rightism and the Global Realignment of Contemporary Conservatism in the 2020s: Trump’s 2025 Presidency and the Transnational Global Right. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat. 2026, 9(3), 211-223. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.18
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Qureshi AS. Radical Rightism and the Global Realignment of Contemporary Conservatism in the 2020s: Trump’s 2025 Presidency and the Transnational Global Right. J Polit Sci Int Relat. 2026;9(3):211-223. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.18
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@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.18,
author = {Amara Sehar Qureshi},
title = {Radical Rightism and the Global Realignment of Contemporary Conservatism in the 2020s: Trump’s 2025 Presidency and the Transnational Global Right},
journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations},
volume = {9},
number = {3},
pages = {211-223},
doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.18},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.18},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20260903.18},
abstract = {This study examines the resurgence and institutionalization of radical right-wing politics and conservative nationalism in the 2020s, focusing on Donald J. Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency and the simultaneous rise of far-right parties worldwide. It argues that contemporary radical right movements have moved from the political margins to become influential forces shaping party systems, media environments, and transnational alliances. The study traces ideological alignments, strategic adaptations, and internal tensions within the global right, highlighting expanding networks across the United States, Europe, and the Global South despite disagreements over sovereignty and foreign policy. Commonly associated with “Trumpism,” these movements emphasize nationalist ideology, charismatic leadership, anti-establishment populism, and an “America First” outlook prioritizing national sovereignty, border control, economic protectionism, and skepticism toward multilateral institutions. It views politics as a moral battle between a “virtuous person” and “corrupt person”, delegitimize the media, bureaucratic institutes, and judicial decrees. They increasingly challenge liberal democratic norms through personalized leadership, declining trust in electoral institutions, and confrontational styles of governance grounded in cultural majoritarianism. Methodologically the study adopts a qualitative, comparative and transnational research design, integrating perspectives from comparative politics, international relations and political communication. The significance of the study lies in demonstrating the immergence of “Illiberal Institutional”, the reconfiguration of sovereignty and multilateralism, and the broader implications of the global conservative realignment for the democratic resilience and of the liberal international order.},
year = {2026}
}
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Radical Rightism and the Global Realignment of Contemporary Conservatism in the 2020s: Trump’s 2025 Presidency and the Transnational Global Right
AU - Amara Sehar Qureshi
Y1 - 2026/08/27
PY - 2026
N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.18
DO - 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.18
T2 - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JF - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JO - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
SP - 211
EP - 223
PB - Science Publishing Group
SN - 2640-2785
UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.18
AB - This study examines the resurgence and institutionalization of radical right-wing politics and conservative nationalism in the 2020s, focusing on Donald J. Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency and the simultaneous rise of far-right parties worldwide. It argues that contemporary radical right movements have moved from the political margins to become influential forces shaping party systems, media environments, and transnational alliances. The study traces ideological alignments, strategic adaptations, and internal tensions within the global right, highlighting expanding networks across the United States, Europe, and the Global South despite disagreements over sovereignty and foreign policy. Commonly associated with “Trumpism,” these movements emphasize nationalist ideology, charismatic leadership, anti-establishment populism, and an “America First” outlook prioritizing national sovereignty, border control, economic protectionism, and skepticism toward multilateral institutions. It views politics as a moral battle between a “virtuous person” and “corrupt person”, delegitimize the media, bureaucratic institutes, and judicial decrees. They increasingly challenge liberal democratic norms through personalized leadership, declining trust in electoral institutions, and confrontational styles of governance grounded in cultural majoritarianism. Methodologically the study adopts a qualitative, comparative and transnational research design, integrating perspectives from comparative politics, international relations and political communication. The significance of the study lies in demonstrating the immergence of “Illiberal Institutional”, the reconfiguration of sovereignty and multilateralism, and the broader implications of the global conservative realignment for the democratic resilience and of the liberal international order.
VL - 9
IS - 3
ER -
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