Developmental Erasure: Political Blame, Institutional Hollowing, and the Developmental Reset in Developing Countries

Zahurul Alam

doi:doi:10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21

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Developmental Erasure: Political Blame, Institutional Hollowing, and the Developmental Reset in Developing Countries

Zahurul Alam^*

Published in Journal of Political Science and International Relations (Volume 9, Issue 3)

Received: 31 August 2026 Accepted: 14 September 2026 Published: 28 September 2026

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Abstract

Development is inherently cumulative, yet political governance in many developing countries remains highly discontinuous. Changes of governments are frequently accompanied by narratives portraying predecessors as responsible for inherited economic, institutional, administrative, and social problems. Legitimate accountability requires investigation of corruption, policy failure, and misuse of public resources. A different phenomenon emerges, however, when successor governments systematically delegitimize, abandon, dismantle, replace, or devalue inherited developmental institutions, projects, programs, and achievements primarily because of their association with a previous political order. This article conceptualizes this phenomenon as developmental erasure and develops Developmental Erasure Theory (DET) as a framework for analyzing it. DET extends the author's earlier Democratic Formalism Theory (DFT) from democratic institutions to development governance. Whereas DFT explains how democratic institutions may formally survive while their substantive qualities deteriorate, DET proposes that development may similarly continue in formal terms while accumulated developmental substance is progressively hollowed out. Drawing on comparative evidence from Ghana and Peru and contemporary evidence from Bangladesh, the article examines political blame, achievement delegitimization, institutional discontinuity, resource erosion, project abandonment, administrative memory loss, citizen suffering, and declining public trust. It distinguishes legitimate reform from politically motivated developmental erasure and proposes a Developmental Erasure Cycle through which political transition can generate blame, delegitimization, institutional distancing, developmental discontinuity, material deterioration, and eventual narrative confirmation. The article argues that developing countries may remain trapped not only because resources are inadequate but also because political systems repeatedly interrupt the continuity through which resources become cumulative developmental capacity. It concludes by proposing policy mechanisms for protecting public value, institutional memory, project continuity, and democratic accountability across political transitions.

Published in	Journal of Political Science and International Relations (Volume 9, Issue 3)
DOI	10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21
Page(s)	244-257
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2026. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Developmental Erasure Theory, Democratic Formalism Theory, Political Transition, Political Blame, Institutional Continuity, Public Investment, Institutional Memory, Developmental Reset

References

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[2]	Alam, Z. (2026). Democratic formalism: Institutional legitimacy, rights erosion, and the crisis of contemporary democracy. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 9(3), 199-210. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.17
[3]	Alam, Z. (2026). Ethics of revolutionary change: Distinguishing people's revolution from conspiracy, elite-driven regime change, and the exploitation of popular sovereignty. Journal of Public Policy and Administration, 10(2), 168-182. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20261002.13
[4]	Alam, Z. (2026). People and leadership: Ontological foundations, historical agency, and the ethics of transformative change. Journal of Human Resource Management, 14(2), 179-193. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jhrm.20261402.18
[5]	Alam, Z. (2026). Resetting the compass: Bangladesh's road to participatory and fair elections. Journal of Public Policy and Administration, 10(1), 38-47. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20261001.14
[6]	Andrews, M. (2013). The limits of institutional reform in development: Changing rules for realistic solutions. Cambridge University Press.
[7]	International Monetary Fund. (2025). Peru: Selected issues. IMF Staff Country Reports, 2025(126). https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229013741.002
[8]	North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press.
[9]	Prothom Alo. (2026, June 21). Contractor absconding, work on 55 bridges, 7 roads held up for 22 months. Prothom Alo.
[10]	Williams, M. J. (2017). The political economy of unfinished development projects: Corruption, clientelism, or collective choice? American Political Science Review, 111(4), 705-723. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000351
[11]	Nguyen, T. C., & Tran, T. L. (2023). The political budget cycles in emerging and developing countries. Journal of Economics and Development, 25(3), 205–225. https://doi.org/10.1108/JED-01-2023-0015
[12]	Thomas, A., & Darsey, J. (2024). How electoral cycles shape the implementation of public works programs: Evidence from India. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 77(1), 106–120. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231195079
[13]	Kaufmann, D., & Kraay, A. C. (2024). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and 2024 update. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 10952. World Bank Group. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10952
[14]	Behuria, P. (2025). Donors and disciplines meet the political economy of development: The contested evolution of political settlements analysis. Progress in Development Studies, 25(2), 79–102. https://doi.org/10.1177/14649934251322274
[15]	World Bank. (2024). World Development Report 2024: The Middle-Income Trap. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-2078-6
[16]	World Bank. (2025). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Revised Methodology for Measuring Governance Using Perception Data. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

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Alam, Z. (2026). Developmental Erasure: Political Blame, Institutional Hollowing, and the Developmental Reset in Developing Countries. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 9(3), 244-257. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21

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Alam, Z. Developmental Erasure: Political Blame, Institutional Hollowing, and the Developmental Reset in Developing Countries. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat. 2026, 9(3), 244-257. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21

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AMA Style

Alam Z. Developmental Erasure: Political Blame, Institutional Hollowing, and the Developmental Reset in Developing Countries. J Polit Sci Int Relat. 2026;9(3):244-257. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21

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@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21,
  author = {Zahurul Alam},
  title = {Developmental Erasure: Political Blame, Institutional Hollowing, and the Developmental Reset in Developing Countries},
  journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations},
  volume = {9},
  number = {3},
  pages = {244-257},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20260903.21},
  abstract = {Development is inherently cumulative, yet political governance in many developing countries remains highly discontinuous. Changes of governments are frequently accompanied by narratives portraying predecessors as responsible for inherited economic, institutional, administrative, and social problems. Legitimate accountability requires investigation of corruption, policy failure, and misuse of public resources. A different phenomenon emerges, however, when successor governments systematically delegitimize, abandon, dismantle, replace, or devalue inherited developmental institutions, projects, programs, and achievements primarily because of their association with a previous political order. This article conceptualizes this phenomenon as developmental erasure and develops Developmental Erasure Theory (DET) as a framework for analyzing it. DET extends the author's earlier Democratic Formalism Theory (DFT) from democratic institutions to development governance. Whereas DFT explains how democratic institutions may formally survive while their substantive qualities deteriorate, DET proposes that development may similarly continue in formal terms while accumulated developmental substance is progressively hollowed out. Drawing on comparative evidence from Ghana and Peru and contemporary evidence from Bangladesh, the article examines political blame, achievement delegitimization, institutional discontinuity, resource erosion, project abandonment, administrative memory loss, citizen suffering, and declining public trust. It distinguishes legitimate reform from politically motivated developmental erasure and proposes a Developmental Erasure Cycle through which political transition can generate blame, delegitimization, institutional distancing, developmental discontinuity, material deterioration, and eventual narrative confirmation. The article argues that developing countries may remain trapped not only because resources are inadequate but also because political systems repeatedly interrupt the continuity through which resources become cumulative developmental capacity. It concludes by proposing policy mechanisms for protecting public value, institutional memory, project continuity, and democratic accountability across political transitions.},
 year = {2026}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Developmental Erasure: Political Blame, Institutional Hollowing, and the Developmental Reset in Developing Countries
AU  - Zahurul Alam
Y1  - 2026/09/28
PY  - 2026
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21
DO  - 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21
T2  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JF  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JO  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
SP  - 244
EP  - 257
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-2785
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21
AB  - Development is inherently cumulative, yet political governance in many developing countries remains highly discontinuous. Changes of governments are frequently accompanied by narratives portraying predecessors as responsible for inherited economic, institutional, administrative, and social problems. Legitimate accountability requires investigation of corruption, policy failure, and misuse of public resources. A different phenomenon emerges, however, when successor governments systematically delegitimize, abandon, dismantle, replace, or devalue inherited developmental institutions, projects, programs, and achievements primarily because of their association with a previous political order. This article conceptualizes this phenomenon as developmental erasure and develops Developmental Erasure Theory (DET) as a framework for analyzing it. DET extends the author's earlier Democratic Formalism Theory (DFT) from democratic institutions to development governance. Whereas DFT explains how democratic institutions may formally survive while their substantive qualities deteriorate, DET proposes that development may similarly continue in formal terms while accumulated developmental substance is progressively hollowed out. Drawing on comparative evidence from Ghana and Peru and contemporary evidence from Bangladesh, the article examines political blame, achievement delegitimization, institutional discontinuity, resource erosion, project abandonment, administrative memory loss, citizen suffering, and declining public trust. It distinguishes legitimate reform from politically motivated developmental erasure and proposes a Developmental Erasure Cycle through which political transition can generate blame, delegitimization, institutional distancing, developmental discontinuity, material deterioration, and eventual narrative confirmation. The article argues that developing countries may remain trapped not only because resources are inadequate but also because political systems repeatedly interrupt the continuity through which resources become cumulative developmental capacity. It concludes by proposing policy mechanisms for protecting public value, institutional memory, project continuity, and democratic accountability across political transitions.
VL  - 9
IS  - 3
ER  -

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Author Information

Zahurul Alam

School of Business, Canadian University of Bangladesh, Dhaka, Bangladesh

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http://orcid.org/0009-0003-1198-9563

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APA Style

Alam, Z. (2026). Developmental Erasure: Political Blame, Institutional Hollowing, and the Developmental Reset in Developing Countries. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 9(3), 244-257. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21

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ACS Style

Alam, Z. Developmental Erasure: Political Blame, Institutional Hollowing, and the Developmental Reset in Developing Countries. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat. 2026, 9(3), 244-257. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21

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AMA Style

Alam Z. Developmental Erasure: Political Blame, Institutional Hollowing, and the Developmental Reset in Developing Countries. J Polit Sci Int Relat. 2026;9(3):244-257. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21,
  author = {Zahurul Alam},
  title = {Developmental Erasure: Political Blame, Institutional Hollowing, and the Developmental Reset in Developing Countries},
  journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations},
  volume = {9},
  number = {3},
  pages = {244-257},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20260903.21},
  abstract = {Development is inherently cumulative, yet political governance in many developing countries remains highly discontinuous. Changes of governments are frequently accompanied by narratives portraying predecessors as responsible for inherited economic, institutional, administrative, and social problems. Legitimate accountability requires investigation of corruption, policy failure, and misuse of public resources. A different phenomenon emerges, however, when successor governments systematically delegitimize, abandon, dismantle, replace, or devalue inherited developmental institutions, projects, programs, and achievements primarily because of their association with a previous political order. This article conceptualizes this phenomenon as developmental erasure and develops Developmental Erasure Theory (DET) as a framework for analyzing it. DET extends the author's earlier Democratic Formalism Theory (DFT) from democratic institutions to development governance. Whereas DFT explains how democratic institutions may formally survive while their substantive qualities deteriorate, DET proposes that development may similarly continue in formal terms while accumulated developmental substance is progressively hollowed out. Drawing on comparative evidence from Ghana and Peru and contemporary evidence from Bangladesh, the article examines political blame, achievement delegitimization, institutional discontinuity, resource erosion, project abandonment, administrative memory loss, citizen suffering, and declining public trust. It distinguishes legitimate reform from politically motivated developmental erasure and proposes a Developmental Erasure Cycle through which political transition can generate blame, delegitimization, institutional distancing, developmental discontinuity, material deterioration, and eventual narrative confirmation. The article argues that developing countries may remain trapped not only because resources are inadequate but also because political systems repeatedly interrupt the continuity through which resources become cumulative developmental capacity. It concludes by proposing policy mechanisms for protecting public value, institutional memory, project continuity, and democratic accountability across political transitions.},
 year = {2026}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Developmental Erasure: Political Blame, Institutional Hollowing, and the Developmental Reset in Developing Countries
AU  - Zahurul Alam
Y1  - 2026/09/28
PY  - 2026
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21
DO  - 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21
T2  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JF  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JO  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
SP  - 244
EP  - 257
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-2785
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260903.21
AB  - Development is inherently cumulative, yet political governance in many developing countries remains highly discontinuous. Changes of governments are frequently accompanied by narratives portraying predecessors as responsible for inherited economic, institutional, administrative, and social problems. Legitimate accountability requires investigation of corruption, policy failure, and misuse of public resources. A different phenomenon emerges, however, when successor governments systematically delegitimize, abandon, dismantle, replace, or devalue inherited developmental institutions, projects, programs, and achievements primarily because of their association with a previous political order. This article conceptualizes this phenomenon as developmental erasure and develops Developmental Erasure Theory (DET) as a framework for analyzing it. DET extends the author's earlier Democratic Formalism Theory (DFT) from democratic institutions to development governance. Whereas DFT explains how democratic institutions may formally survive while their substantive qualities deteriorate, DET proposes that development may similarly continue in formal terms while accumulated developmental substance is progressively hollowed out. Drawing on comparative evidence from Ghana and Peru and contemporary evidence from Bangladesh, the article examines political blame, achievement delegitimization, institutional discontinuity, resource erosion, project abandonment, administrative memory loss, citizen suffering, and declining public trust. It distinguishes legitimate reform from politically motivated developmental erasure and proposes a Developmental Erasure Cycle through which political transition can generate blame, delegitimization, institutional distancing, developmental discontinuity, material deterioration, and eventual narrative confirmation. The article argues that developing countries may remain trapped not only because resources are inadequate but also because political systems repeatedly interrupt the continuity through which resources become cumulative developmental capacity. It concludes by proposing policy mechanisms for protecting public value, institutional memory, project continuity, and democratic accountability across political transitions.
VL  - 9
IS  - 3
ER  -

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