The relationship between social legitimacy and legal power/authority in permanent and transitional governance is examined in this essay. In 1960, Somalia gained independence and became known as the Somali Democratic Republic. The dictatorial government of Siad Barre was a major factor in the Somali Democratic Republic's collapse after 31 years of independence and two more administrations. Bringing Somali ethnological clan groups together to rebuild the nation-state has been a major problem for the international community. Institutional fragility is a common feature of transitional societies, where political stability and public trust cannot be sustained by constitutional legitimacy alone. This study examines how formal state institutions—primarily the federal government, federal member states, traditional sectors, and international and national organisation or groups that are socially embedded actors—negotiate governance authority in contexts of political transition, post-conflict reconstruction, and institutional uncertainty using a qualitative normative approach. According to different perspectives, the introduction of openness, accountability, participation, rule of law, and societal legitimacy often diminishes illegitimate authority. However, a large number of participants agreed that the rule of law is crucial to any government and that violations of its principles can result in arbitrariness and defilements/violations of fundamental rights. However, despite not having a formal constitutional standing, informal governance systems may become more widely accepted in society even though they are not linked to social legitimacy. The paper presents the idea of "legitimacy-fluid governance," which describes the dynamic transfer of power between formal and informal institutions based on societal approval, public trust, and political performance. The study identified the role of the rule of law in guaranteeing good governance and how corruption and power abuse have gravely threatened it, which in turn has an impact on good governance. This study validates that the demise of subsequent governments, whether permanent or transitional, since independence on July 1st, 1960, to the present day, is fundamentally shaped by the dynamic interaction between legal authority and social legitimacy. In conclusion, as the Somali political system has undergone changes across the three stages of governance, the study addresses the proposed definition of legitimacy and the issue of political disorder within the Somali federal government, while also offering satisfactory solutions to the problems identified in the study. In addition, customs and clans have gained strong social recognition over the years, even though they lack formal constitutional standing and operate informally in conflict resolution at both local and federal levels, as clan conflicts transcend the clan-based federal states.
| Published in | Journal of Political Science and International Relations (Volume 9, Issue 4) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.15 |
| Page(s) | 297-310 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2026. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Political Legitimacy, Permanent and Transitional Governance, Clan-Based Rebel Groups, Socially Embedded Actors, Legitimacy-Fluid Governance, Traditional Sectors
Response | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
|---|---|---|---|
Sex of respondent | |||
Male | 74 | 62.2% | 1.9x10-9 |
Female | 45 | 37.8% | |
Total | 119 | 100% | |
Age of respondent | |||
21-30 | 15 | 12.6% | |
31-40 | 22 | 18.5% | |
41-50 | 37 | 31.1% | |
above 50 | 45 | 37.8% | 8.82x10-2 |
Total | 119 | 100% | |
Marital status | |||
single | 40 | 33.6% | |
married | 78 | 65.5% | 5.4x10-11 |
widowed | 1 | 0.8% | |
Total | 119 | 100% | |
Highest education level. | |||
Bachelor degree.1 | 39 | 32.8% | 5.3X10-18 |
secondary education4 | 15 | 12.6% | |
Master Degree2 | 32 | 26.9% | |
Phd5 | 7 | 5.9% | |
no former education3 | 26 | 21.8% | |
Total | 119 | 100% |
Value | Frequency (F) | Percentage (%) | P-value |
|---|---|---|---|
It created jobs | 24 | 20.17% | 1.4x10-5 |
It was a good government | 21 | 17.65% | |
It provided health services | 19 | 15.97% | |
It provided good social services | 17 | 14.29% | |
It provided education and justice | 16 | 13.45% | 1.31x10-1 |
Prevention of corruption was strong | 13 | 10.92% | |
There was no misuse of public property or favouritism in hiring | 9 | 7.56% | |
Total | 119 | 100.00% |
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
|---|---|---|---|
The government failed to govern the country well, did not provide adequate public services, and failed to stablish that rule of law to be binding thus, gain legitimacy from the people | 70 | 58.82% | 7.7x10-7 |
The pursuit of Greater Somalia and the emphasis placed on building a strong military | 49 | 41.18% | |
Total | 119 | 100.00% |
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
|---|---|---|---|
Lack of civil freedom for citizens to enter into business agreements | 24 | 20.17% | 3.2x10-4NS |
Lack of legal rights for citizens to oppose the government or take part in its political power | 23 | 19.33% | |
Lack of civil liberties and political rights | 22 | 18.49% | |
Absence of public recognition and trust applied equally; the law not enforced equally, and the government not fully governed by rule of law | 20 | 16.81% | |
Lack of private property rights | 16 | 13.45% | |
Procedural justice: a fair way of resolving disputes between two or more citizens; each side given the chance to defend their case, the government responding appropriately to citizens’ grievances, and providing explanations based on individual circumstances | 14 | 11.76% | 4.93x10-4 |
Total | 119 | 100.00% |
Do you agree with Mohamed Siyad Barre and his Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) suspending the 1960 constitution, abolishing the Supreme Court, dissolving Parliament, and banning all political parties, and afterward ruling by military decree and scientific socialism? | |||
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
Yes | 39 | 32.8% | |
No | 80 | 67.2% | 5.85x10-14 |
Total | 119 | 100% | |
Transitional governance is fundamentally shaped by the dynamic/constant interaction between legal authority and social legitimacy. | |||
Value | Frequency | Percentage | p-value |
Yes | 85 | 71.4% | 2.15X10-18 |
No | 34 | 28.6% | |
Total | 119 | 100% | |
Value | Frequency | Percentage | |
Constitutional legality alone is insufficient to establish sustainable governance because institutional authority lacks public trust and societal recognition. | |||
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
Yes | 81 | 68.1% | 4.97X10-14 |
No | 38 | 31.9% | |
Total | 119 | 100% | |
Therefore, transitional societies operate within a fragile political environment where governance continuously oscillates between institutional order and social disorder. | |||
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
Yes | 87 | 73.1% | 2.25X10-20 |
No | 32 | 26.9% | |
Total | 119 | 100% | |
Legal authority remains essential for maintaining institutional continuity, constitutional accountability, and administrative coordination, but cannot function effectively when detached from the social realities, cultural expectations, and participatory aspirations of society. | |||
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
Yes | 89 | 74.8% | 1.38X10-21 |
No | 30 | 25.2% | |
Total | 119 | 100% | |
Governments that rely excessively/only on procedural legality or coercive enforcement often encounter legitimacy crises, public distrust, and governance instability. | |||
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
Yes | 90 | 75.6% | 2.75X10-24 |
No | 29 | 24.4% | |
Total | 119 | 100% | |
How do you view the one-man rule system that the government was based on? Was the democratic system of parliamentary and presidential elections that existed before the military took control of the country’s rule better? If it was better, in what way was it better? | |||
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
Yes | 90 | 75.6% | 1.32 X10-23 |
No | 29 | 24.4% | |
Total | 119 | 100% | |
10b. If it was better, in what ways was it effective? | |||
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
Social services such as education and health | 71 | 59.7% | |
Security | 41 | 34.5% | |
The rights mentioned above, such as personal rights and citizens’ rights | 4 | 3.4% | |
People did not recognize that it held public trust (legitimacy) and the legitimacy to remain in power | 3 | 2.5% | 2.68X10-10 |
Total | 119 | 100 | |
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
|---|---|---|---|
Social Contract | 34 | 28.57% | 6.50X10-2 |
Compatibility with a community’s shared norms and values | 31 | 26.05% | |
Institutions being given the trust and cooperation necessary to function smoothly, rather than relying only on force or coercion | 29 | 24.37% | |
Widespread public acceptance | 25 | 21.01% | |
Total | 119 | 100% |
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
|---|---|---|---|
Legal authority is purely a technical/administrative matter, so social trust has no real effect on it; the weakening is caused only by poor law enforcement. | 14 | 11.76% | |
Formal law derives its real power from public trust and acceptance, not from its written status alone; when government becomes corrupt, unfair, or unjust, people lose trust in it and turn instead to custom and clan, which have earned lasting social recognition through generations of consistent practice, familiar leadership, and their ability to resolve disputes in ways society understands. | 43 | 36.13% | 4.3X10-25 |
Custom and clan gain recognition simply because they are older than formal state law, regardless of how fair or effective they are. | 39 | 32.77% | 8.32x10-2 NS |
Legal authority weakens only when clan leaders actively work to undermine the government's power. | 12 | 10.08% | |
Formal law and custom operate in completely separate spheres and never compete for legitimacy, so the weakening of one has no relation to the strength of the other. | 11 | 9.24% | |
Total | 119 | 100% |
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
|---|---|---|---|
An administration's legitimacy is permanent once it gains official/legal status, regardless of later performance. | 28 | 24% | |
An administration's legitimacy is not fixed it evolves continuously, depending on political performance, public trust, and social acceptance; when it serves justly, delivers services, and remains accountable, its legitimacy strengthens, but corruption, poor performance, or ignoring public needs cause that legitimacy to weaken or collapse. | 35 | 29.4% | |
Legitimacy is determined solely by the administration's official name or title, not by how it performs. | 24 | 20% | |
An administration's legitimacy depends only on military or political power, not on public opinion. | 19 | 16% | |
Once an administration is legally established, public trust becomes irrelevant to its continued existence. | 13 | 11% | 6.99X10-5 |
Total | 119 | 100% |
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
|---|---|---|---|
Transitional governance succeeds mainly through enforcement capacity (finance and police power), regardless of public trust or participation. | 27 | 23% | 2.32X10-5 |
Sustainable transitional governance depends on combining legitimate institutions, inclusive participation of all sections of society, and laws that reflect real social needs; when society is consulted and included, it builds trust, reduces conflict, and creates a sense of ownership — without this balance, governance becomes fragile and can collapse. | 42 | 35% | 6.25X10-12 |
Institutional legitimacy alone is sufficient for governance to succeed, regardless of public participation. | 21 | 18% | 3.87X10-1NS |
Legislation only needs to follow formal legal procedure; it does not need to reflect society's actual needs or circumstances. | 17 | 14% | |
Public participation is optional and mainly symbolic governance stability depends only on strong institutions. | 12 | 10% | |
Total | 119 | 100% |
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
|---|---|---|---|
Formal legal authority automatically carries full legitimacy during transition, regardless of public trust or societal recognition. | 20 | 17% | 7.9910-4 |
During transitional periods, formal institutions often lack public trust because they are new and untested, so people continue relying on traditional or social systems they already trust; legitimacy only strengthens when the government shows transparency, delivers justice and services fairly, and earns society's support through consistent action rather than through formal status alone. | 63 | 53% | 1.12X10-37 |
Political fragility during transition is caused only by insecurity, with no connection to public trust or institutional performance. | 14 | 12% | 9.77 X10-2 |
Once elections are held, a transitional government automatically gains full public trust and recognition. | 12 | 10% | |
Public trust is irrelevant during transitional periods since legal authority is sufficient on its own. | 10 | 8% | |
Total | 119 | 100% |
Value | Frequency | Percentage | P-value |
|---|---|---|---|
Order depends only on institutional legality; social legitimacy has no real influence on whether a system stays stable or falls into disorder. | 22 | 18.5% | 3.78X10-4 |
Governance sits between order and disorder because legal authority alone is not enough lasting stability requires society's acceptance and trust as well; when institutions act with integrity, deliver justice, and maintain dialogue w ith the people, legitimacy and order reinforce each other, but corruption or loss of trust pushes governance toward disorder. | 56 | 47%S | 1.63X10-25 |
Disorder is caused only by external political fragility, with no connection to legitimacy or public trust. | 17 | 14.3% | 8.26 X10-2 |
Once an institution is legally established, social acceptance becomes unnecessary for maintaining order. | 14 | 11.8% | |
Legitimacy and legality never actually compete or interact — they operate in completely separate spheres. | 10 | 8.4% | 8.42X10-3 |
Total | 119 | 100% |
SRC | Supreme Revolutionary Council |
UN | United Nations |
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APA Style
Farah, A. A., Khalif, A. M. (2026). Legal Status and Political Legitimacy in Somali Permanent and Transitional Governance since Independence: Between Rule and Anarchy. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 9(4), 297-310. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.15
ACS Style
Farah, A. A.; Khalif, A. M. Legal Status and Political Legitimacy in Somali Permanent and Transitional Governance since Independence: Between Rule and Anarchy. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat. 2026, 9(4), 297-310. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.15
@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.15,
author = {Abdiqani Ahmed Farah and Abdifatah Mohamed Khalif},
title = {Legal Status and Political Legitimacy in Somali Permanent and Transitional Governance since Independence: Between Rule and Anarchy},
journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations},
volume = {9},
number = {4},
pages = {297-310},
doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.15},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.15},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20260904.15},
abstract = {The relationship between social legitimacy and legal power/authority in permanent and transitional governance is examined in this essay. In 1960, Somalia gained independence and became known as the Somali Democratic Republic. The dictatorial government of Siad Barre was a major factor in the Somali Democratic Republic's collapse after 31 years of independence and two more administrations. Bringing Somali ethnological clan groups together to rebuild the nation-state has been a major problem for the international community. Institutional fragility is a common feature of transitional societies, where political stability and public trust cannot be sustained by constitutional legitimacy alone. This study examines how formal state institutions—primarily the federal government, federal member states, traditional sectors, and international and national organisation or groups that are socially embedded actors—negotiate governance authority in contexts of political transition, post-conflict reconstruction, and institutional uncertainty using a qualitative normative approach. According to different perspectives, the introduction of openness, accountability, participation, rule of law, and societal legitimacy often diminishes illegitimate authority. However, a large number of participants agreed that the rule of law is crucial to any government and that violations of its principles can result in arbitrariness and defilements/violations of fundamental rights. However, despite not having a formal constitutional standing, informal governance systems may become more widely accepted in society even though they are not linked to social legitimacy. The paper presents the idea of "legitimacy-fluid governance," which describes the dynamic transfer of power between formal and informal institutions based on societal approval, public trust, and political performance. The study identified the role of the rule of law in guaranteeing good governance and how corruption and power abuse have gravely threatened it, which in turn has an impact on good governance. This study validates that the demise of subsequent governments, whether permanent or transitional, since independence on July 1st, 1960, to the present day, is fundamentally shaped by the dynamic interaction between legal authority and social legitimacy. In conclusion, as the Somali political system has undergone changes across the three stages of governance, the study addresses the proposed definition of legitimacy and the issue of political disorder within the Somali federal government, while also offering satisfactory solutions to the problems identified in the study. In addition, customs and clans have gained strong social recognition over the years, even though they lack formal constitutional standing and operate informally in conflict resolution at both local and federal levels, as clan conflicts transcend the clan-based federal states.},
year = {2026}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - Legal Status and Political Legitimacy in Somali Permanent and Transitional Governance since Independence: Between Rule and Anarchy AU - Abdiqani Ahmed Farah AU - Abdifatah Mohamed Khalif Y1 - 2026/11/14 PY - 2026 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.15 DO - 10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.15 T2 - Journal of Political Science and International Relations JF - Journal of Political Science and International Relations JO - Journal of Political Science and International Relations SP - 297 EP - 310 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2640-2785 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20260904.15 AB - The relationship between social legitimacy and legal power/authority in permanent and transitional governance is examined in this essay. In 1960, Somalia gained independence and became known as the Somali Democratic Republic. The dictatorial government of Siad Barre was a major factor in the Somali Democratic Republic's collapse after 31 years of independence and two more administrations. Bringing Somali ethnological clan groups together to rebuild the nation-state has been a major problem for the international community. Institutional fragility is a common feature of transitional societies, where political stability and public trust cannot be sustained by constitutional legitimacy alone. This study examines how formal state institutions—primarily the federal government, federal member states, traditional sectors, and international and national organisation or groups that are socially embedded actors—negotiate governance authority in contexts of political transition, post-conflict reconstruction, and institutional uncertainty using a qualitative normative approach. According to different perspectives, the introduction of openness, accountability, participation, rule of law, and societal legitimacy often diminishes illegitimate authority. However, a large number of participants agreed that the rule of law is crucial to any government and that violations of its principles can result in arbitrariness and defilements/violations of fundamental rights. However, despite not having a formal constitutional standing, informal governance systems may become more widely accepted in society even though they are not linked to social legitimacy. The paper presents the idea of "legitimacy-fluid governance," which describes the dynamic transfer of power between formal and informal institutions based on societal approval, public trust, and political performance. The study identified the role of the rule of law in guaranteeing good governance and how corruption and power abuse have gravely threatened it, which in turn has an impact on good governance. This study validates that the demise of subsequent governments, whether permanent or transitional, since independence on July 1st, 1960, to the present day, is fundamentally shaped by the dynamic interaction between legal authority and social legitimacy. In conclusion, as the Somali political system has undergone changes across the three stages of governance, the study addresses the proposed definition of legitimacy and the issue of political disorder within the Somali federal government, while also offering satisfactory solutions to the problems identified in the study. In addition, customs and clans have gained strong social recognition over the years, even though they lack formal constitutional standing and operate informally in conflict resolution at both local and federal levels, as clan conflicts transcend the clan-based federal states. VL - 9 IS - 4 ER -